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All of the presently effective statutory sections which provide for
the motion to strike, as directed to pleadings, have been on the books
since the enactment of the North Carolina Code of Civil Procedure in
1868.1 However, the large number of recent cases dealing with the
motion seem to indicate that its extensive utilization is a comparatively
recent development.
It is fundamental that the pleader is required to state the facts con-
stituting his cause of action or defense in ordinary and concise lan-
guage, without unnecessary repetition.2 Condemnation of irrelevancy
and redundancy is thereby implied, but the exercise of the power to
strike is, as a general rule, based on express authority. Thus, it is
expressly provided that matter may be stricken which is (1) irrelevant
or redundant,8 (2) scandalous and impertinent,4 (3) frivolous5 or
sham.8 Other grounds not provided for by statutory enactment or
rules of practice, and not frequently encountered, but recognized by the
North Carolina Supreme Court, are: (1) nonconformity of an amend-
ment to the terms of the order permitting it,7 and (2) departure from
the complaint in the reply.8 These grounds, in the order set out, will
serve as a convenient break-down for consideration of the use of the
motion to strike. The right of appeal from an adverse ruling on the
motion, as affected by the time of filing, deserves special treatment in a
separate section.
* Professor of Law and Dean of the School of Law, University of North
Carolina.
** Member, Student Board of Editors, North Carolina Law Review.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-126 (1943) (sham and irrelevant defenses), §1-153
(irrelevant, redundant, indefinite pleadings), §1-219 (frivolous pleadings) and
§1-277 (appeal from judicial orders) existed in the Code of Civil Procedure as
§§104, 120, 218 and 299, respectively. As to the striking of "scandalous or im-
pertinent" matter, covered by Rule 20(3) of the Rules of Practice in the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, the exercise of the power was affirmed in Powell v.
Cobb, 56 N. C. 1 (1856).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-122 (1943) (complaint) ; §1-135 (answer); §1-141
(reply).
I N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-153 (1943).
'Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Rule 20(3).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-219 (1943).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-126 (1943).
'See section IV infra.
8 See section V infra.
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I. IRRELEVANCY AND REDUNDANCY
"If irrelevant or redundant matter is inserted in a pleading, it may
be stricken out on motion of any person aggrieved thereby .... 
By way of introduction, it may be well first to examine some of
the tactical reasons or motives, as 'distinguished from grounds, which
may induce counsel to object in this manner to the pleadings of an
opponent. (Regrettably, the motion may at times be advanced for the
purpose of delaying the proceedings or harassing opposing counsel, but
such a motive is by no means confined to the motion to strike and it
merits no special consideration here.)
(1) A desire to prevent allegations from being brought to the atten-
tion of the jury when the pleadings are read, at the opening of the
trial, is by far the most prevalent primary motive,10 and may often
exist although some other predominates in the particular case. Although
the prospect of prejudice cannot be successfully advanced as a ground
for the motion to strike,' the North Carolina court has nevertheless
recognized this as a strong inducement for striking on grounds of
irrelevancy or redundancy.
12
Much time would probably be saved litigants and courts, both trial
and appellate, if North Carolina abandoned the practice of reading the
pleadings to the jury in favor of summary opening statements by coun-
sel. This would remove the temptation to cast allegations in a form
-designed primarily to elicit the sympathy of the jury, and would usually
make the motion to strike unnecessary even when such allegations are
included. It is difficult to see that anything would be lost by such a
change. The jury is supposed to reach its decision on the evidence,
not the pleadings. Further, it can be given a better understanding of
9N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-153 (1943).
"See, e.g., Parlier v. Drum, 231 N. C. 155, 56 S. E. 2d 383 (1949) ; Parker
v. Duke University, 230 N. C. 656, 55 S. E. 2d 189 (1949) ; Edwards v. Edwards,
230 N. C. 176, 52 S. E. 2d 281 (1949) ; Medlin v. Powell, 229 N. C. 323, 49 S. E.
2d 618 (1948); Bynum v. Fidelity Bank, 219 N. C. 109, 12 S. E. 2d 898 (1941);
Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938); Poovey v. Hick-
ory, 210 N. C. 630, 188 S. E. 78 (1936) ; Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E.
756 (1936) ; Brown v. Southern Ry., 202 N. C. 256, 162 S. E. 613 (1932) ; Tar
Heel Hosiery Mill v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 198 N. C. 596, 152 S. E. 794
(1930).
" "The jury's verdict is to be rendered on evidence-not on controverted
allegations of the complaint." Parker v. Duke University, 230 N. C. 656, 657, 55
S. E. 2d 189, 190 (1949). See Tar Heel Hosiery Mill v. Durham Hosiery Mills,
198 N. C. 596, 152 S. E. 794 (1930) where the prospect of prejudice was im-
properly assigned as a ground for striking.
1 Parlier v. Drum, 231 N. C. 155, 56 S. E. 2d 383 (1949) ; Edwards v. Ed-
wards, 230 N. C. 176, 52 S. E. 2d 281' (1949) ; see Carolina Power & Light Co.
v. Bowman, 231 N. C. 332, 333, 56 S. E. 2d 602, 603 (1949) ; Privette v. Privette,
230 N. C. 52, 53, 51-S. E. 2d 925, 926 (1949). As subsequently indicated in the
text, the recent case of Hinson v. Britt, 232 N. C. 379, 61 S. E. 2d 185 (1950),
requires a showing of prejudice in order to secure reversal of denial of a motion
to strike on the ground of irrelevancy.
As to the motion to strike as scandalous see section II infra.
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the true issues in the case by an opening statement than by reading the
pleadings.
(2) Apparently the moving party sometimes hopes that the deletion
of objectionable matter will leave the pleading insufficient to withstand
demurrer.' 3 When this motive is dearly apparent, the motion followed
by -demurrer is unlikely to be more successful than demurrer without
the motion. If allegations are, in fact, irrelevant, they contribute noth-
ing to the statement of the cause of action or defense and should not
prevent the sustaining of a demurrer. If they are not irrelevant they
should not be stricken. This has been recognized by the court.14 Per-
haps, however, counsel feels in an occasional case that the lines are not
clear in advance and that a motion to strike is an appropriate pre-
liminary to demurrer.
(3) Counsel may desire to obtain a decision, before pleading, as to
whether the allegations attacked are material in the sense that they will
be admitted if not denied.15
(4) At times the effort is apparently to secure a decision, in ad-
vance of trial, as to the propriety of a doubtful issue attempted to be
raised by an adversary in aid of his cause of action or defense, or as
to the relevancy of evidence required to support it.16 Aside from pre-
"See Privette v. Morgan, 227 N. C. 264, 41 S. E. 2d 845 (1947); Hill v.
Stansbury, 221 N. C. 339, 20 S. E. 2d 308 (1942) (also indicating that "allega-
tions of law" may be stricken). In Ellis v. Ellis, 198 N . C. 767, 153 S. E. 449
(1930), the granting of a motion to strike was affirmed because the allegations
remaining in the complaint were sufficient to present the plaintiff's cause of action.
" In Elliot v. Swartz Industries, 231 N. C. 425, 57 S. E. 2d 305 (1950), while
defendant's motion to strike certain portions of the complaint was pending, he
was served with an order to show cause why a temporary restraining order should
not issue. He moved for a continuance on the ground that he intended to demur
to the complaint as failing to state a cause of action but could not do so until
the complaint was in final form. The Supreme Court said: "The want of logical
connection between defendant's motion to strike and the motion to continue the
case seems apparent. If it was necessary to trim down the complaint in order to
support the demurrer to the cause of action contained in it, the deletion of such
matter would have been improper." 231 N. C. at 426, 57 S. E. 2d at 306.
In Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N. C. 134, 52 S. E. 2d 371 (1949), the complaint
was saved from demurrer by allegations which had been unsuccessfully attacked
by a motion to strike as "irrelevant, redundant and prejudicial" on a prior appeal
reported in 229 N. C. 355, 49 S. E. 2d 638 (1948). Compare Brief for Appellee,
p. 2, suith Transcript of Record, pp. 2-4, on the second appeal.
" Best v. Clyde, 86 N. C. 4 (1882). For possible recent examples see Terry v.
Capital Ice & Coal Co., 231 N. C. 103, 55 S. E. 2d 926 (1949) ; Patuxent Develop-
ment Co. v. Bearden, 227 N. C. 124, 41 S. E. 2d 85 (1947).
"o See Richardson v. Welsh, 232 N. C. 331, 59 S. E. 2d 632 (1950) (accusation
of improper influence of one not a party to the action) ; Foy v. Foy Electric Co., 231
N. C. 161, 56 S. E. 2d 418 (1949) (suit against corporation for negligence of
its agent; answer alleged that agent was plaintiff's father and a major share-
holder of defendant); Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lbr. Co., 228 N. C. 786,
47 S. E. 2d 19 (1948) (action for inducing a breach of contract; answer alleged
performance of contract impossible); Truelove v. Durham & S. Ry., 222 N. C.
704, 24 S. E. 2d 537 (1943) (allegation that train negligently left station ahead
of schedule, so as to arrive at crossing contemporaneously with plaintiff); Tar
Heel Hosiery Mill v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 198 N. C. 596, 152 S. E. 794 (1930)
1950]
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venting the presentation of incompetent matter to the jury through the
medium of the pleadings, a final decision at the pleading stage may be
of value in the preparation of the case for trial. Moreover, notwith-
standing some judicial expressions to the contrary,17 the court has recog-
nized a possibility that the continued presence of contested allegations
may render evidence admissible which would otherwise be excluded.18
A. Motion as Directed to Specific Allegations.
1. Irrelevancy.
When an allegation is attacked by a motion to strike it as irrelevant,
by what standard is it to be adjudged good or bad? Any attempt to
understand the present state of the law necessitates a chronological ex-
amination of the cases. This will serve to preclude any hasty assumption
that a single, simple test has, as yet, been conclusively adopted.
The case of Pemberton v. Greensboro"9 contained all the seeds of
the conflict which was to follow. The defendant's motion to strike
allegations of certain elements of damage was denied, the plaintiff hav-
ing offered to supply a bill of particulars. In affirming the decision,
the Supreme Court said: "It is readily conceded that nothing ought to
be in the complaint, or remain there over objection, which is not com-
petent to be shown on the hearing. But the matter can better be
determined after the bill of particulars has been filed."2 0
One unbroken line of cases, beginning with the second Pemberton
appeal2l in 1934, consistently asserted a policy against attempting, in the
Supreme Court, "to chart the course of the trial in advance," with the
admonition that neither denying nor granting a motion to strike for
irrelevancy is conclusive on the question of relevancy of evidence at the
trial.22 The validity of this warning was demonstrated on the third
appeal in the Pemberton case,2 when the court reversed a judgment for
plaintiff for error in the admission of evidence on an element of dam-
age which had been unsuccessfully attacked on the former appeals. The
(appellant contended certain allegations were irrelevant and immaterial, would be
prejudicial when read to the jury, and would render admissible evidence not perti-
nent to the determinative issues).
11 See subsection A of this section, infra.
18 "The pleadings in a cause raise issues of fact to be decided by a jury, chart
the course of the trial and, in large measure, determine the competency of evi-
dence." Privette v. Privette. 230 N. C. 52, 53, 51 S. E. 2d 925, 926 (1949)
(appeal from denial of a motion to strike matter from another motion; dismissed).
" 203 N. C. 514, 166 S. E. 396 (1932).20 Id. at 515, 166 S. E. at 397.
P emberton v. Greensboro, 205 N. C. 599, 172 S. E. 196 (1934).
"2 Pemberton v. Greensboro, supra note 21 ; Teasley v. Teasley, 205 N. C. 604.
172 S. E. 197 (1934); McDonald v. Zimmerman, 206 N. C. 746, 175 S. E. 92
(1934); Revis v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 237, 176 S. E. 738 (1934); Hardy v. Dahl,
209 N. C. 746, 184 S. E. 480 (1936); Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E.
756 (1936) ; Ludwick v. Southern Ry., 212 N. C. 664, 194 S. E. 282 (1937).
2" Pemberton v. Greensboro, 208 N. C. 466, 181 S. E. 258 (1935).
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application of the "no charting" policy, as exemplified by these cases,
results in an affirmance of the trial court's action without commitment
as to its correctness, the Supreme Court being uncertain of the relevancy
of the allegation and apprehensive that the appellee might be unduly
prejudiced at the trial by premature and ill-advised action on their
part.24 To determine, after trial, whether a party has been prejudiced
would ordinarily be less difficult than to decide, before trial, whether
he is likely to be prejudiced. Moreover, a disappointed movant retains
his second line of defense-that of objecting to the evidence when it is
offered.
A second line of cases, also unbroken except for a parting shot from
Justice Devin,25 begins with Patterson v. Southern Ry. 26 in 1938. In
these, citing the dictum above quoted from the first Pemberton case, it
is consistently asserted that the test of relevancy is whether evidence to
support the allegation would be competent at the trial.27 By contrast
with the preceding group of cases, in these cases the Supreme Court
decides whether the allegations are relevant and whether the motion to
strike should be granted or denied.
These two lines of cases do not set up conflicting tests of relevancy.
Nevertheless, their approach to the problem is quite different. One
espouses a test of relevancy (though necessarily a vague one). The
other makes no attempt to formulate a test, but merely adopts a "hands
off" policy.
Some attempt to deal with these two discordant sources of brief-
making material was obviously desirable."" The attempt was made in
the late Justice Seawell's opinion in Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry? 9
It was a difficult case for the purpose. The allegations involved, if
irrelevant, were made so primarily by policy considerations, as dis-
tinguished from lack of logical bearing on the primary issue of negli-
24 9.. . we think the allegations should be permitted to remain in defendant's
pleading, and that the court should not cut off at the outset an alleged defense
which may or may not become material at the trial. The matter can be more
properly presented for judicial determination when the evidence is offered at the
hearing." Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 N. C. 235, 236, 4
S. E. 2d 439 (1939).
The usual result of the "no charting" rule is an affirmance of the denial of a
motion to strike. However, in Scarboro v. Morgan, 231 N. C. 597, 58 S. E. 2d
354 (1950), it was applied to affirm an order granting the motion.
"5Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 24.
2 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938).
2T Patterson v. Southern Ry., supra note 26; Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop,
214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938); Duke v. Crippled Children's Commission,
214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938); Wadesboro v. Coxe, 215 N. C. 708, 2 S. E.
2d 876 (1939) ; Whitlow v. Southern Ry., 217 N. C. 558, 8 S. E. 2d 809 (1940) ;
Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940) ; Sayles v. Loftis, 217
N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940)."S Note, 19 N. C. L. REv. 55 (1940).
20 221 N. C. 292, 20 S. E. 2d 299 (1942).
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gence; but they conceivably might have become the subject of proof at
the trial if subsidiary issues arose.3 0
The case stemmed from a blind-crossing accident in which the
plaintiff was injured in a collision with the defendant's train. Among
the allegations of the complaint, which the lower court refused to strike,
were two which would have been incompetent on the issue of negligence
if offered as evidence, viz: (1) that defendant removed freight cars,
which had obstructed visibility, from an adjacent siding on the day fol-
lowing the accident, and (2) that defendant subsequently disciplined the
employees involved in the accident. On appeal, the defendant urged
the "competency of evidence" line of cases, while the plaintiff invoked
the "no charting" rule. The court drew a distinction between relevancy
as applied to evidence and as applied to allegations, based on the pur-
pose each is 'designed to fulfill.8 1 As to the relevancy of allegations, the
following test is propounded:
"Looking at its purpose, an allegation is relevant if it tends,
as an element thereof, to express the cause of action on which
relief is sought. (This seems to be the gist or common meeting
ground of the numerous tests laid down by this Court) [citing
cases]. . . . Thus, in the instant case, even though the ques-
tioned allegations standing alone would be insufficient to set up
negligence, or are not coupled with other allegations which
would make up a cause of action, if they do amount to an ele-
ment of the cause of action, they would be relevant, and should
not be stricken-at least for irrelevancy."
3 2
In applying this test to the allegations indicated above, the court
said, in effect, that the acts alleged did not contribute to or aggravate
the plaintiff's injury and were unnecessary to a detailed statement of
the negligence. It concluded (reversing the trial court) that the allega-
8
oSTANsBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE §180 (1946).
s' "The relevancy of an allegation, like the relevancy of evidence, depends upon
the purpose which the particular legal instrument is intended to fulfill. The pur-
pose of an allegation in a complaint, broadly speaking, is to state a fact which,
when considered with other facts, will constitute a cause of action. The purpose
of evidence is to prove competent allegations. The relevancy of either depends
upon its tendency to fulfill its purpose. The rules concerning the relevancy of
evidence, although helpful in analogy, have no bearing on the relevancy of the
allegations, for, strictly speaking, it is by the competent allegations that the
relevancy of the evidence is to be judged-whether the evidence tends to prove
facts properly alleged as a cause of action in the complaint. This makes the
relevancy of the allegations the subject of independent inquiry, divorced, except
by analogy, from the rules concerning the relevancy of evidence." Parrish v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 221 N. C. 292, 297, 20 S. E. 2d 299, 302 (1942). The
basic distinction here drawn is sound. However, any test of relevancy of allega-
tions must share with the test of relevancy of evidence the necessity of invoking
logic and experience. There must be an appraisal of the relationship between the
facts, whether "ultimate" or "evidentiary," and the issues which may properly be
raised in the case.2Id. at 297, 20 S. E. 2d at 303.
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tions must be stricken because clearly irrelevant. But then came the
lollowing passage:
"It is at best a pleading of evidence, and should therefore also
be stricken as redundant. It might be wise to point out that in
this State, as in most states, for motives of public policy, evi-
dence of this character is not admissible to show either negligence
or an admission of negligence. Certainly, therefore, an allegation
in this vein would not be proper."' '
In the Parrish case the court thus clearly refused to apply the "no
charting" rule to the situation before it. It followed the other line of
cases in passing upon relevancy and requiring that allegations be
stricken, but it substituted a differently stated test (equally vague) -of
relevancy. However, it is questionable whether there is any significant
distinction between the two tests, since the earlier one did not purport
to decide whether evidence in the words of the allegation would be
relevant, but whether any evidence to support the allegation would be
competent.
Shortly thereafter, when the "no charting" cases were again urged
upon it, the court said, also through Justice Seawell:
"We understand the expressions used by the Court in these
cases to be precautionary and expressive of the danger of putting
the lower court in trammels upon a doubtful matter, when, as
the case is factually developed on the trial, the propriety of a
challenged pleading might be vindicated, or its impropriety more
clearly established."3 4
No subsequent case has attempted to invoke the relevancy test of the
Parrish case. Four recent opinions by Justice Barnhill15 have repeated
the "competency of evidence" test, while three by Chief Justice Stacy3 6
have invoked the "no charting" policy. The fact that no 'dissenting
voice is raised in any of these cases becomes less surprising upon ex-
amination of two other opinions, one by Justice Devin,87 the other by
88 Id. at 299, 20 S. E. 2d at 304.
"Hill v. Stansbury, 221 N. C. 339, 342, 20 S. E. 2d 308, 310 (1942). This
case actually echoed the "no charting" policy in affirming the lower court's re-
fusal to strike from the complaint matter which was not materially prejudicial,
while perceiving a "possibility that the development of the case may be unduly
hampered by injudicious pruning, especially of the drastic nature demanded by
defendant." Id. at 343.
"Edwards v. Edwards, 230 N. C. 176, 52 S. E. 2d 281 (1949) ; Privette v.
Privette, 230 N. C. 52, 51 S. E. 2d 925 (1949) ; Penny v. Stone, 228 N. C. 295,
45 S. E. 2d 362 (1947) ; Williams v. Thompson, 227 N. C. 166, 41 S. E. 2d 359
(1947).
" Scarboro v. Morgan, 231 N. C. 597, 58 S. E. 2d 354 (1950) ; Terry v. Capital
Ice & Coal Co., 231 N. C. 103, 55 S. E. 2d 926 (1949); Parker v. Duke Univer-
sity, 230 N. C. 656, 55 S. E. 2d 189 (1949).
" Parlier v. Drum, 231 N. C. 155, 56 S. E. 2d 383 (1949).
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justice Barnhill,3 8 which state that the court will not undertake to
chart the course of the trial unless matter which would be incompetent
in evidence is inserted in the pleadings.
The more recent case of Hinson v. Britt"9 contains still a different
statement of the court's attitude. This was an action for wrongful
search of the plaintiff's premises. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants failed to execute official bonds as required by law and for this
reason were without authority to execute a search warrant if they had
one. A motion to strike this allegation as irrelevant was 'denied by the
trial judge. Justice Ervin, speaking for a unanimous court, said that
the defendants were at least de facto officers and that the allegation was
therefore irrelevant and should have been stricken. The order was
nevertheless affirmed.
"This Court does not correct errors of the Superior Court
unless such errors prejudicially affect the substantial rights of
the party appealing. Hence, the denying or overruling of a mo-
tion to strike matter from a pleading under the provisions of
G. S. 1-153 is not ground for reversal unless the record affirm-
atively reveals these two things: (1) That the matter is irrelevant
or redundant; and (2) that its retention in the pleading will
cause harm or injustice to the moving party."
40
The case exemplifies the current tendency of the court not to re-
verse a judgment for error without the positive appearance of prejudice
--one of the principal advocates of which is the author of the instant
opinion.41  (The possible effect of this on appeals is subsequently
considered.) 2
It is clear that the language of the opinions is conflicting and con-
fusing. However, while there is some conflict in the results reached
by the cases, results are much less conflicting than the language. This
is because many of the opinions purport to lay down rules of general
application, though the court is thinking primarily in terms of the pre-
cise situation before it.
The Hinson case is an obvious attempt to make a fresh start in a
limited area-i.e., the situation in which the lower court judge has re-
"' Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman, 231 N. C. 332, 56 S. E. 2d 602
(1949).
" 232 N. C. 379, 61 S. E. 2d 185 (1950). The case was followed in a brief
per curiam opinion in Buchanan v. Dickerson, Inc., 232 N. C. 421, 61 S. E. 2d
187 (1950).
o232 N. C. at 382, 61 S. E. 2d at 187.
See the following opinions by justice Ervin: Call v. Stroud, 232 N. C. 478,
61 S. E. 2d 342 (1950); Nichols v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 231 N. C.
158, 56 S. E. 2d 429 (1949) ; Hanks v. Norfolk & Western R. R., 230 N. C. 179,
185, 52 S. E. 2d 717, 721 (1949) (dissent); State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50
S. E. 2d 520 (1948)." See note 119 infra.
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fused to strike irrelevant allegations. It is clearly sound, but it makes
no attempt to cover the entire field.
Something further is needed in the light of the welter of confusing
assertions made in prior cases. The court might well, as it has some-
times done in the past, take advantage of the opportunity provided by
some future case to announce a set of rules covering the normal field
of Supreme Court action. Any such set of rules must take into account
at least the following: (a) the decision of the lower court judge; (b)
the degree of doubt as to the relevancy of the allegations; (c) whether
the allegations, particularly when read to the jury, will cause substantial
harm or injustice; and (d) the relationship of the decision on the motion
to strike to the subsequent conduct of the trial.
Each of these has been given weight in one or more decisions. The
difficulty has been that many of the opinions have tended ostensibly to
give undue weight to one or more at the expense of the others. Pos-
sibly rules along the following lines would tend to put each of the first
three considerations listed in the preceding paragraph in its proper re-
lation to the others.
1. If the allegation is relevant and:
a. The lower court judge denies the motion he should, of course,
be sustained.
b. The lower court judge grants the motion:
(1) If the remainder of, the cause of action or defense is thus
rendered subject to demurrer, there should be a reversal.
(2) If, short of this, the allegations stricken materially
strengthen the pleader's case, there should ordinarily be
a reversal because the pleader is substantially prejudiced
by the lower court action.
(3) If the pleader cannot show substantial harm or injustice,
there should be no reversal.
2. If the allegation is irrelevant and:
(a) The lower court judge grants the motion he should, of
course, be sustained.
(b) The lower court judge denies the motion he should be re-
versed only if substantial harm or injustice can be shown.
(This is the Hinson case.)
3. If relevancy is in doubt, in the sense that it depends upon devel-
opments at the trial:
(a) The lower court judge should 'deny the motion and, where
he does so, should be sustained.
19501
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(b) If the lower court judge grants the motion he should be
reversed if substantial harm or injustice is shown; other-
wise not.
There remains the necessity of fitting into the picture the relation-
ship of the decision on the motion to the subsequent conduct of the
trial. As already indicated, some cases have held that decision on the
motion-whether to grant or to deny-is not conclusive on the question
of relevancy of evidence. This clearly ought to be a rule of general
application when there is no appeal from the 'decision on the motion.
That is, the decision of a lower court judge on the motion should not
become the law of the case in such a way as to restrict the trial judge
in ruling on evidence. In fact, any other rule would encourage appeals
in an area where they are already made too frequently. Even so, the
decision on the motion is likely to influence the action of the trial judge.
As long as appeal is freely allowed, he may reason that the losing party
must not believe serious error was committed, or he would have appealed.
When the decision on the motion is appealed, the situation is some-
what different. If the Supreme Court writes an opinion indicating that
an allegation is irrelevant, the trial judge is most unlikely to admit evi-
dence to the same effect unless at the trial issues develop which were
not anticipated at the time of the motion. If the Supreme Court indi-
cates a belief that the allegation is relevant, the trial judge is most un-
likely to exclude evidence to support it unless its relevancy depends upon
proof of other allegations and insufficient evidence as to them is
forthcomifig.
Therefore, when the Supreme Court passes upon an appeal from a
decision on the motion, it should always indicate that the allegation is
relevant or irrelevant, or that the court is not passing upon relevancy.
Finally, it may be pointed out that the above suggestions contain
no test of relevancy. The same may be said of the Hinson case and the
cases adopting the "no charting" rule. However, the above suggestions
assume that there is some test of relevancy, even though when applied
to the particular case it gives no conclusive answer. The writers do
not regard the phrasing of such a test as a matter of vital importance.
The test must necessarily be very general. It will not be self-
executing. It will derive concrete meaning only as it is applied to
specific cases. Its application in a negligence case will mean little in
predicting the result of its application in a malicious prosecution case-
and may mean little in predicting the result of another negligence case
involving wholly different facts. An understanding of the elements of
various causes of action is far more helpful than any generally stated
test of relevancy.
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2. Redundancy.
"The complaint must contain . . . a plain and concise statement of
the facts constituting a cause of action, without unnecessary repeti-
tion .... 43 Allegations which contain excessive fullness in detail, or
unnecessary repetition, are redundant; and this includes allegations of
evidentiary facts.44 For this purpose, the distinction has been drawn
between "ultimate facts" and "probative facts"--the former being those
facts essential to a statement of a cause of action or defense, the latter
constituting the evidence tending to prove the former.45
There is also authority that evidentiary allegations are irrelevant.46
However, since "probative facts," though stricken, may yet be relevant
as evidence, they would be more exactly classified as redundant.4 7
B. Motion as Directed to an Entire Cause of Action, Defense or
Counterclaim.
Whereas a motion to strike specific allegations has been said not to
raise the question of the sufficiency of the pleading as a whole,48 when
the motion is directed to an entire cause of action, defense or counter-
claim on the ground of irrelevancy,49 it becomes the equivalent of a
demurrer in so far as its ultimate effect on the pleading is concerned."
Although the motion to strike, so used, has been described as an "un-
usual practice in this State,"51 in several cases it has been expressly
13N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-122 (1943). As to the answer, see §1-135 ("ordinary
and concise language, without repetitiof") ; §1-141 (reply).
"Long v. Love, 230 N. C. 535, 53 S. E. 2d 661 (1949); Chason v. Marley,
223 N. C. 738, 28 S. E. 2d 223 (1943) ; Hawkins v. Moss, 222 N. C. 95, 21 S. E.
2d 873 (1942); Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 221 N. C. 292, 20 S. E. 2d
299,(1942).
See Long v. Love, supra note 44; Winders v. Hill, 141 N. C. 694, 702, 54
S. E. 440, 443 (1906) ("Probative facts are those -which may be in controversy,
but they are not issuable") ; Bynum v. Fidelity Bank, 219 N. C. 109, 118, 12 S. E.
2d 898, 904 (1941) (dissenting opinion)." "Allegations which set forth evidential or immaterial matters, or matters
foreign to the controversy, would be considered irrelevant and impertinent, and
excessive fullness of detail or the repetition of facts would be redundant." Mc-
INTOsH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AN]D PRocEuDRE §371 (1929), quoted with
apparent approval in Revis v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 237, 176 S. E. 738 (1934), in
Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Smathers, 211 N. C. 373, 190 S. E. 484 (1937), and in
Brown v. Hall, 226 N. C. 732, 40 S. E. 2d 412 (1946).
7, "It [redundancy] would seem to include anything which is unnecessary to a
'plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action' . . . such
as unnecessary'repetition, and the detailed statement of evidential matters, how-
ever relevant the latter may be when presented upon the trial .... (McIntosh
considers evidential matters in a complaint as irrelevant. It would seem more
accurate to class them as redundant, but this is probably only of academic in-
terest.)" Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 221 N. C. 292, 298, 20 S. E. 2d
299, 303 (1942).
" Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., supra note 47; Poovey v. Hickory,
210 N. C. 630, 188 S. E. 78 (1936).
"As to motion to strike as frivolous see section III infra.
"oAs to differences in appeal rights see section VI infra.
"1 American Nat. Bank v. Hill, 169 N. C. 235, 236, 85 S. E. 2d 209 (1915).
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treated as a demurrer.5 2  In Horton v. Perry5 3 a motion to strike a
cross-claim as "irrelevant, prejudicial and improper" was sustained as
a "demurrer" without reference to the form in which the objection was
raised. And in Comm'rs of Yancey County v. Piercy54 the court said,
in affirming an order which granted a motion to strike a counterclaim:
"It makes but little difference whether the point is made by demurrer,
the more regular way, or by an order striking out that part of the
answer, as was done here. Upon demurrer the plaintiff would be en-
titled to judgment, and by striking out that part of the answer, they
[sic] are still entitled to their judgment." '55
Where a demurrer and a motion to strike are directed to the same
matter, the demurrer may be sustained and the motion granted ;56 and
this applies where a motion to strike is followed by a demurrer ore
tenus.57 But a sufficient denial may save an answer from a motion to
strike it in its entirety while a demurrer is sustained to an improper
counterclaim contained therein.58
It has been made clear that the motion to strike may test not only
the availability or propriety of a defense or counterclaim,50 but also the
sufficiency of a statement of a defense, counterclaim, or cause of action.60
Averments of fraud which are insufficient to state a cause of action for
actionable fraud against the plaintiff may be stricken from the answer
as "foreign to the issues."61 In Patuxent Development Co. v. Bearden0
2
the plaintiff's allegations of fraud in its "second cause of action" were
held insufficient. In reversing the lower court's refusal to strike, the
court said: "If the plaintiff has not stated a cause of action in the sec-
"Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. 2d 105 (1946) ;
Smith v. Smith, 225 N. C. 189, 34 S. E. 2d 148 (1945) ; American Nat. Bank v.
Hill, 169 N. C. 235, 85 S. E. 209 (1915).
"229 N. C. 319, 49 S. E. 2d 734 (1948).
"72 N. C. 181 (1875).
" Id. at 183.
"Vestal v. White, 229 N. C. 414, 49 S. E. 2d 927 (1948).
Patuxent Development Co. v. Bearden, 227 N. C. 124, 41 S. E. 2d 85
(1947) ; cf. Adridge Motors v. Alexander, 217 N. C. 750, 9 S. E. 2d 469 (1940).
" Hancammon v. Carr, 229 N. C. 52, 47 5. E. 2d 614 (1948) ; cf. Town of
Apex v. Templeton, 223 N. C. 645, 27 S. E. 2d 617 (1943) (motion to strike entire
answer granted as to counterclaim only-sufficient denial remained).
"Smith v. Smith, 225 N. C. 189, 34 S. E. 2d 148 (1945) ; Town of Apex v.
Templeton, supra note 58; Comm'rs of Yancey County v. Piercy, 72 N. C. 181
(1875) ; Horton v. Perry, 229 N. C. 319, 49 S. E. 2d 734 (1948) (cross-claim).
But cf. Turlington v. Williams, 84 N. C. 125 (1881).
"Stephenson v. Raleigh, 232 N. C. 42, 59 S. E. 2d 195 (1950) (cause of
action); Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. 2d 105
(1946) (same); American Nat. Bank v. Hill, 169 N. C. 235, 85 S. E. 209 (1915)
(counterclaim); Hancammon v. Carr, 229 N. C. 52, 47 S. E. 2d 614 (1948)
(answer); Sayles v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940) (defense);
Wike v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 229 N. C. 370, 49 S. E. 2d 740
(1948) (cross-claim in defeasance of plaintiff's cause of action).
" Thalhimer v. Adams, 232 N. C. 96, 59 S. E. 2d 358 (1950); Privette v.
Morgan, 227 N. C. 264, 41 S. E. 2d 845 (1947).
2227 N. C. 124, 41 S. E. 2d 85 (1947).
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ond section of the complaint, that part is wholly irrelevant and
redundant...."63
A unique situation arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Where an award has been paid, a suit in the name of the injured em-
ployee against a third party tort-feasor is, to the extent of the award,
for the benefit of the employer or his insurance carrier; but the Act
expressly excludes the amount of the award as evidence in such a suit.
6 4
An allegation that the plaintiff has accepted an award of compensation
and is not the real party in interest will, on motion, be stricken as an
insufficient &tefense.65 Since the Act exempts the employer from tort
liability, he cannot be brought into the action as a joint tort-feasor,66
and a cross-claim against him will be stricken on motion.67 But if the
allegation that an award has been paid is coupled with one that the
employer was contributorily negligent, it will not be stricken ;68 and, if
contributory negligence on the part is of the employer is proved, only
so much of the judgment as exceeds the award is collectible-this for
the sole use of the employee.
69
C. Use of Motion as Substitute for Motion for Summary Judgment.
Unfortunately, the motion for summary judgment whereby the
movant may, with supporting affidavits, force the adversary to substan-
tiate his pleading with like evidence-at peril of perjury on the one
hand or an adverse judgment on the other-is as yet unknown to our
state court practice.70 Likewise, a "speaking demurrer," which alleges
facts not apparent from the pleading demurred to, will not be con-
sidered. 71
In Little v. Bost 72 the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations
and the plaintiff replied that the action was begun within one year after
nonsuit of a prior action between the same parties. Defendant moved
to strike this latter allegation on the ground that no complaint was filed
in the prior action and hence the plaintiff had no competent evidence
with which to prove the identity of the actions. The motion was granted.
63 Id. at 127, 41 S. E. 2d at 87.
1, N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-10 (1943).
" Sayles v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940) ; Brown v. Southern
Ry., 202 N. C. 256, 162 S. E. 613 (1932).
"Brown v. Southern Ry., supra note 65.
'TEledge v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 230 N. C. 584, 55 S. E. 2d 179
(1949). This immunity also extends to his employees as "those conducting his
business" under N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-9 (1943). Essick v. Lexington, 232 N. C.
200, 60 S. E. 2d 106 (1950).
Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N. C. 668, 169 S. E. 419 (1933).
"Eledge v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 230 N. C. 584, 55 S. E. 2d 179
(1949).
70 See Chadbourn, A Summary Judgment Procedure for North Carolina, 14
N. C. L. Ray. 211 (1936).
"1 Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N. C. 134, 52 S. E. 2d 371 (1949); Sandlin v.
Wilmington, 185 N. C. 257, 116 S. E. 733 (1923).72208 N. C. 762, 182 S. E. 448 (1935).
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Since this resembles a motion for summary judgment or a "speak-
ing demurrer," if it has any implications beyond the immediate facts
they are probably confined to situations in which the decision may be
rested entirely upon matters of record.73 At any rate, this use of the
motion to strike operates in too narrow a field to make it an adequate
substitute for the motion for summary judgment.
II. SCANDALOUS AND IMPERTINENT ALLEGATIONS
"Pleadings containing scandalous or impertinent matter will, in a
plain case, be ordered by the Court to be stricken from the record, or
reformed; and for this purpose the Court may refer it to the clerk, or
some member of the bar, to examine and report the character of the
same."
74
Although no statute expressly authorizes the striking of scandalous
or impertinent matter, the power was recognized in pre-Code practice, 5
thus indicating that lower courts have inherent power to strike such
matter. Moreover, it appears that the court may, upon its own initiative,
refuse to receive a pleading containing offensive language or, upon its
discovery, order it removed from the files until reformed.76 The pur-
pose of the rule is to prevent the degeneration of the pleadings into a
medium through which to cast aspersions upon the opposing party or his
counsel when the occasion does not call for it; and, further, to eliminate
the possibility of prejudice which is apt to be produced in the minds of
the jurors by the knowledge of matter extraneous to the merits of the
controversy. 77 In its ultimate effect, there is little difference between
the striking of matter as scandalous and striking insufficient allegations
of fraud as irrelevant. 8
"In Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686 (1929), it is indi-
cated that the pendency of a prior action, as a bar to a present suit, may be
raised either by demurrer or answer to the complaint. However, N. C. GEN. STAT.
§1-127 (1943) makes such pendency a ground for demurrer when it appears from
the face of the complaint, while N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-133 (1943) provides that
it may be raised by answer when not appearing from the complaint. When raised
by answer, decision on this defense may be secured before trial by making a
motion to dismiss. See Dwiggins v. Parkway Bus Co., 230 N. C. 234, 52 S. E.
2d 892 (1949).
In Reece v. Reece, 231 N. C. 321, 56 S. E. 2d 641 (1949), defendant's motion
to dismiss, made before answer, alleged, as grounds, another action pending. The
court considered this the equivalent of a "speaking demurrer," but, since the fact
alleged was admitted, it proceeded to pass on the merits.
" Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, Rule 20(3).
" Powell v. Cobb, 56 N. C. 1 (1856).
" See Mitchell v. Brown, 88 N. C. 156, 157 (1883) (reply declared answer to
be "corruptly false").
"See Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938) ; Powell
v. Cobb, 56 N. C. 1 (1856) (indicating the mind of the judge may also need
protection).
"Thalhimer v. Adams, 232 N. C. 96, 59 S. E. 2d 358 (1950); Privette v.
Morgan, 227 N. C. 264, 41 S. E. 2d 845 (1947) ; see also Patuxent Development
Co. v. Bearden, 227 N. C. 124, 41 S. E. 2d 85 (1947).
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It has been said that if the allegations, however scandalous in the
sense that they reflect discredit on the opposing party, are nevertheless
relevant and material, they will not be stricken.79 If this be taken liter-
ally, the rule dealing with scandalous matter gives the court no power
it does not have under the statute dealing with irrelevant and redundant
allegations. However, any irrelevant allegation which is also scandalous
is necessarily prejudicial and clearly should be stricken; and a refusal
to strike it would almost always be reversible error.8 0
Further, there should be one distinction between the power to strike
scandalous allegations and the power to strike irrelevant allegations. If
allegations, though dealing with relevant derogatory matter, are un-
necessarily vituperative or obscene, they could be stricken as scandalous,
though not as irrelevant.
The rule of practice, quoted at the beginning of this section, provides
for the striking of "scandalous or impertinent" matter. However, it is
doubtful that "impertinent" adds anything to "scandalous" and "irrel-
evant." 8'
III. FRIVOLOUS AND SHAM PLEADINGS AND DEMURRERS
"Sham and irrelevant answers and defenses may be stricken out on
motion, upon such terms as the court may in its discretion impose.
8s2
"If a demurrer, answer or reply is frivolous, the party prejudiced
thereby may apply to the court or judge for judgment thereon, which
may be granted accordingly."8
A. Frivolous Pleadings.
"An irrelevant answer is one which has no substantial relation to the
controversy between the parties to the action; and an answer is
frivolous when, assuming its contents to be true, it presents no defense
to the action .... The distinction between an irrelevant and frivolous
answer is virtually without difference, and they may be considered as
correlative terms."8 4 A frivolous answer has also been defined as one
raising "no issue or question of fact or law pertinent and material in
the action."8 5
"'See Powell v. Cobb, 56 N. C. 1, 3 (1856) ; Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214
N. C. 38. 43. 198 S. E. 364. 367 (1938)."0See Parlier v. Drum, 231 N. C. 155, 56 S. E. 2d 383 (1949). In Patterson
v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38, 42, 198 S. E. 364, 367 (1938), it is said that"an aggrieved party may have irrelevant or redundant matter stricken from his
opponent's pleading, especially when such matter is prejudicial to him, or
scandalous."
81 In Powell v. Cobb, 56 N. C. 1, 3 (1856), it is said, "No matter is imperti-
nent, however scandalous it may be . . . provided it be relevant and bear upon
the point about which the parties are at issue." See also BLACK, LAv DicTIoN-
ARY 923 (3d ed. 1933).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-126 (1943). 8IN. C. GEN. STAT. §1-219 (1943).
", Howell v. Ferguson, 87 N. C. 113, 115 (1882). See also Brogden v. Henry,
83 N. C. 274 (1880).
"Weil v. Uzzel, 92 N. C. 515, 517 (1885).
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The motion to strike as frivolous, when directed to an entire plead-
ing, is equivalent to a 'demurrer in the sense that it tests the sufficiency
of the pleading attacked.8 6 A possible distinction-that a demurrer ad-
mits the allegations of the pleading while a motion does not, and that
where the answer is filed in good faith the pleader is entitled to have
the facts alleged either admitted by demurrer or tried by jury-was
drawn in some of the earlier cases.87 However, the distinction was
unnecessary to the decisions, was clearly not made in either Comm'rs of
Yancey County v. Piercy8s or Howell v. Ferguson,89 and is apparently
another way of stating that (just as on demurrer) doubts will be re-
solved in favor of the sufficiency of the pleading. 0
Where only part of the pleading is stricken as frivolous, if any issue
remains, no judgment on the pleadings should be entered.9 ' On the
other hand, if an entire pleading is frivolous, judgment may be entered
on the pleadings even though no formal order striking it is made.0
2
The motion to strike as frivolous is not a substitute for a motion
for summary judgment. Some cases state that bad faith of the pleader
will render the pleading frivolous.93 However, this refers to bad faith
discoverable upon "bare inspection," and the opportunity to show falsity
and bad faith by extrinsic evidence is not afforded.9 4 Thus, whether
or not the motion is treated as a demurrer, there is an initial presump-
tion that the pleading speaks the truth, and if it raises an issue of fact
the pleader is entitled to go to the jury.9 5
B. Frivolous Demurrer.
Since a demurrer cannot be irrelevant in any ordinary sense, here
irrelevancy and frivolousness cannot be synonymous. A frivolous de-
murrer is one which raises no question of law worthy of serious con-
" See First Nat. Bank v. Pearson, 119 N. C. 494, 26 S. E. 46 (1896) (de-
fense) ; Howell v. Ferguson, 87 N. C. 113 (1882) (affirmative defense) ; Comm'rs
of Yancey County v. Piercy, 72 N. C. 181 (1875) (counterclaim). As to differ-
ences in appeal rights see section VI infra.
87 Brogden v. Henry, 83 N. C. 274 (1880) ; Dail v. Harper, 83 N. C. 5 (1880);
Womble v. Fraps, 77 N. C. 198 (1877) ; Erwin v. Lowery, 64 N. C. 321 (1870).
8872 N. C. 181 (1875). 89 87 N. C. 113 (1882).
90See Campbell v. Patton, 113 N. C. 481, 18 S. E. 687 (1893); Western
Carolina Bank v. Atkinson, 113 N. C. 478, 18 S. E. 703 (1893) ; Buie v. Brown,
104 N. C. 335, 10 S. E. 465 (1889) ; Hull v. Carter, 83 N. C. 249 (1880).
9" See Buie v. Brown, supra note 90.
92 See First Nat. Bank v. Pearson, 119 N. C. 494, 26 S. E. 46 (1896); Weil
v. Uzzel, 92 N. C. 515 (1885).
"
3Western Carolina Bank v. Atkinson, 113 N. C. 478, 18 S. E. 703 (1893);
Campbell v. Patton, 113 N. C. 481, 18 S. E. 687 (1893); Brogden v. Henry, 83
N. C. 274 (1880) ; Hull v. Carter, 83 N. C. 249 (1880).
' Broocks v. Muirhead, 221 N. C. 466, 20 S. E. 2d 273 (1942) (motion to
strike as sham, but the principle is the same) ; cf. Wellons v. Lassiter, 200 N. C.
474, 157 S. E. 434 (1931) (assuming judgment was irregular when based on
extrinsic evidence, sole remedy is appeal).
"' See Chadbourn, A Summary Judgment Procedure for North Carolina, 14
N. C. L. Ray. 211 (1936).
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sideration and is interposed for purposes of delay."" One which points
out a fatal defect in the pleading demurred to obviously cannot be
held frivolous.
9 7
If a demurrer is adjudged frivolous, the court may enter judgment
for the adversary.9 8 But this should not be done unless the -demurrer
is "clearly and palpably" frivolous.P9 Even then, the judge, in his dis-
cretion, may permit the demurring party to plead over.'10 In Morgan
v'. Harris' the defendant appealed from an order overruling his de-
murrer and the plaintiff appealed from the refusal to hold it frivolous.
The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed, such refusal not being appeal-
able,10 2 but the court said that the trial judge erred in not holding the
demurrer frivolous and that plaintiff would be entitled to judgment by
default "unless the court below is of the opinion that in the exercise of
a sound discretion the facts justify permission to answer over."''0 3
C. Sham Pleadings.
A sham plea has been defined as one which is "false in fact."'10 4  It
has also been defined as "one put in for form sake, but presenting no
matter upon which a material issue of fact can be joined,"'10 5 and this
is applied to treat an insufficient denial as an admission.10
Since it is not possible to show falsity of a pleading by extrinsic
evidence on a motion to strike it as sham,' 0 7 the first definition lacks
practical utility, and the motion cannot be used as a substitute for a
"' Porter v. Grimsley, 98 N. C. 550, 4 S. E. 529 (1887) ; Hurst v. Addington,
84 N. C. 143 (1881) ; Johnston v. Pate, 83 N. C. 110 (1880).
'7 Davis v. Whitehurst, 229 N. C. 226, 49 S. E. 2d 394 (1948).
" Porter v. Grimsley, 98 N. C. 550, 4 S. E. 529 (1887) ; Hurst v. Addington,
84 N. C. 143 (1881); Johnston v. Pate, 83 N. C. 110 (1880); Dunn v. Barnes,
73 N. C. 273 (1875).
New Bern Banking & Trust Co. v. Duffy, 156 N. C. 83, 72 S. E. 96 (1911).
"We think it is the duty of the Judge always to allow a party to plead, after his
demurrer is overruled, unless it is manifest that the demurrer was merely friv-
olous, did not raise any question of law worthy of serious consideration and was
interposed merely for delay." Swepson v. Harvey, 66 N. C. 436, 437 (1872).
The 1872 amendment to G. S. 1-162 renders such permission to plead over manda-
tory "if it appear that the demurrer was interposed in good faith." And see
Morgan v. Harris, 141 N. C. 358, 360, 54 S. E. 381, 382 (1906).
10 Parker v. North Carolina R. R., 150 N. C. 433, 64 S. E. 186 (1909);
Abbott v. Hancock, 123 N. C. 89, 31 S. E. 271 (1898).
10o 141 N. C. 358, 54 S. E. 381 (1906).
102 As to appeal rights see section VI infra.
103 141 N. C: at 360, 54 S. E. at 382.
10" See Howell v. Ferguson, 87 N. C. 113, 115 (1882); Boone v. Hardie, 83
N. C. 471, 473 (1880). In the first case the test was not applicable. In the
second, the decision turned on the pleader's belief as to the truth of the allega-
tions. i.e., good faith.
" Long v. Fish, 70 N. C. 674 (1874).
100 See Deloatch v. Vinson, 108 N. C. 147, 12 S. E. 895 (1891); Schehan v.
Malone, 71 N. C. 441 (1874); Flack v. Dawson, 69 N. C. 42 (1873).107Broocks v. Muirhead, 221 N. C. 466, 20 S. E. 2d 273 (1942). "... the
court below exceeded its authority in hearing evidence upon the merits of the
plaintiff's motion." Id. at 467.
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motion for summary judgment.10 8 The second definition is the one
actually followed, and this restricts the motion to a device the primary
purpose of which is to test the sufficiency of a denial. Assuming no
issue is raised if the denial is insufficient, it is simply a form of motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
IV. AMENDMENTS NOT CONFORMING TO ORDER
When an order permitting an amendment to a pleading restricts its
content, so much of the amended pleading as is not in conformity with
the order may be stricken out.10 9 G. S. 1-163 provides the judge with
a liberal discretion to allow amendments "on such terms as may be
proper,'" but, unlike G. S. 1-161, which provides that amendments made
"as of course" may be stricken when filed for purposes of delay, this
section makes no express provision for striking amendments permitted
by discretion. However, where the judge has discretion to refuse the
permission, it follows that he has discretion to strike an amendment
which exceeds or abuses the permission. On the other hand, if the
order granting permission to amend is not appealed,110 a second Superior
Court judge is without power to strike an amendment which, liberally
construed in favor of the pleader, conforms with the terms of the
order."'
V. DEPARTURE IN REPLY
When allegations in a reply are inconsistent with the allegations in
the complaint, the inconsistent allegations of the reply will be stricken
out on appropriate motion." 2  In Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co."8 there is an affirmative holding that a reply must be "limited
to a denial of any new matter set up in the answer" and that allegations
containing matters beyond the scope of a denial should be stricken. But
the two cases cited for the proposition fail to support it," 4 and G. S.
1o'See Chadbourn, A Summary Judgment Procedure for North Carolina,
14 N. C. L. REv. 211 (1936).
10' Ellis v. Ellis, 198 N. C. 767, 153 S. E. 449 (1930).
0 A ruling, on an application for leave to amend under G. S. 1-163 is not
subject to review on appeal "unless the circumstances affirmatively disclose a
manifest abuse by the court of its discretionary power." Hooper v. Glenn, 230
N. C. 571, 573, 53 S. E. 2d 843, 844 (1949).
I" Dockery v. Fairbanks-Morse Co., 172 N. C. 529, 90 S. E. 501 (1916).
112 Miller v. Grimsley, 220 N. C. 514, 17 S. E. 2d 642 (1941). In this case,
a land controversy, the complaint set out a description of the land showing a
reservation of a corner lot to the defendants. The reply then attacked the
reservation as being insufficient for vagueness of description in the deed.
But a reply which attacked, as fraudulently obtained, a contract alleged in the
answer was held not inconsistent with a complaint which alleged a dissimilar con-
tract. Bryan v. Acme Manufacturing Co., 209 N. C. 720, 184 S. E. 471 (1936)."1 216 N. C. 235, 4,.S E. 2d 439 (1939).
114In Revis v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 237, 176 S. E. 738 (1934), the motion to
strike allegations of the reply was made under G. S. 1-153 for irrelevancy or
redundancy. The decision affirming the order to strike was expressly placed on
the ground that the reply contained allegations of evidential facts as distinguished
[Vol. 29
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1-141 expressly permits the plaintiff to "allege... any new matter not
inconsistent with the complaint, constituting a defense to the new matter
in the answer."
VI. TiME FOR MAKING MOTION; APPEALS
A. Irrelevancy and Redundancy.
The statute providing that the court may strike irrelevant or re-
dundant allegations further provides that the motion "must be made
before answer or -demurrer, or before an extension of time to plead is
granted."" 5 This statute has been construed in connection with G. S.
1-277, which provides that "an appeal may be taken from every judicial
order . . . which affects a substantial right . . . or which in effect de-
termines the action."" 6 Further, in determining whether the right of
the movant is substantial, the court has indicated that the pleader's
satutory right extends only to stating his cause or defense in a plain
and concise manner, thus implying a right in the movant to prune
allegations which are irrelevant.1l 7 As a result of the court's interpre-
from ultimate facts, without reference to consistency with or departure from the
complaint. In Wadesboro v. Coxe, 215 N. C. 708, 2 S. E. 2d 876 (1939), the
motion was directed to irrelevant allegations in the complaint. No reply was
involved.
"'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §1-153 (1943). When the motion is made within the
time specified, there can be no default judgment for want of an answer until the
motion has been decided, since the defendant has thirty days after service of sum-
mons "or after the final determination of any .. . motion required to be made
rior to the filing of the answer" in which to plead. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-125
(1943). See Heffner v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 N. C. 359, 199
S. E. 293 (1938).
11 "Some doubt has been expressed whether an order denying a motion to
strike under [G. S. 1-153] is immediately appealable. The question hinges upon
whether such order affects a substantial right of the disappointed movant. [G. S.
1-277] Otherwise, it would be his privilege, if he so desired, to note an ex-
ception and proceed with the trial. But it is apparent that if his relief is confined
to a further objection when evidence is offered, he gets nothing which he would
not have gotten without making a motion; whereas, the statute intends to give
him something and to give it to him in time to be of service.
"It has been held by this Court, and we think with reason, that when the
motion is made in apt time ... it is made as a matter of right. . . ." Hill v.
Stansbury, 221 N. C. 339, 341, 20 S. E. 2d 308, 309 (1942). See also Privette
v. Morgan, 227 N. C. 264, 41 S. E. 2d 845 (1947); Parrish v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R., 221 N. C. 292, 20 S. E. 2d 299 (1942).
'1 7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-122, 1-135 (1943), Wadesboro v. Coxe, 215 N. C.
708, 710, 2 S. E. 2d 876, 877 (1939) ; Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38. 42,
198 S. E. 364, 367 (1938) ("A party to an action is entitled as a matter of right
to put into his pleading a concise statement of the facts constituting his cause of
action or defense, and nothing more.")
"If . . . an interlocutory order affects a substantial right of a party to the
action ... he may appeal therefrom to this Court. ...
The complaint should contain a plain and concise statement of the facts
which constitute the cause of action upon which plaintiff demands judgment against
the defendant. [G. S. 1-122] If matter is alleged therein which is irrelevant,
immaterial or redundant, defendant has a right to have same stricken from the
complaint and there was error in the refusal of its motion, made in apt time, and
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tation of these various statutes, it has become a firmly established rule
that where a motion to strike irrelevant allegations is made within the
time specified by G. S. 1-153, it is madle as a matter of right and the
decision is immediately reviewable under G. S. 1-277; while, if made
thereafter, the decision is within the discretion of the trial court.118
Thus, failure to file a motion to strike within the time permitted
may constitute waiver of any existing right to insist upon it. Even
when the motion is made "in apt time," the ultimate decision may be
that no right exists in the particular case; but the right to relief from
prejudicial error entails the right to an appellate hearing to determine
whether prejudicial error exists, and since correction at the pleading
stage may prevent the necessity of a second trial, it is possible that the
delay resulting from the allowance of immediate appeals is a justifiable
sacrifice. 19
When the motion is not made in apt time, an appeal from an order
denying it may be dismissed.120 But, although there are dicta to the
contrary,' 21 the discretion exists only to deny the motion; that is to say,
in accordance with the provisions of (G. S. 1-153]." Tar Heel Hosiery Mill v.
Durham Hosiery Mills, 198 N. C. 596, 598, 152 S. E. 794, 795 (1930). See also
Poovey v. Hickory, 210 N. C. 630, 188 S. E. 78 (1936) ; Ellis v. Ellis, 198 N. C.
767, 153 S. E. 449 (1930). But see Rhodes v. Jones, 232 N. C. 547, - S. E.
2d - (1950).
"I Parlier v. Drum, 231 N. C. 155, 56 S. E. 2d 383 (1949) ; Fleming v. Caro-
lina Power & Light Co., 229 N. C. 397, 50 S. E. 2d 45 (1948) ; Privette v. Morgan,
227 N. C. 264, 41 S. E. 2d 845 (1947) ; Brown v. Hall, 226 N. C. 732, 40 S. E.
2d 412 (1946) ; Hill v. Stansbury, 221 N. C. 339, 20 S. E. 2d 308 (1942) ; Parrish
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 221 N. C. 292, 20 S. E. 2d 299 (1942) ; Herndon v.
Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940) ; Fayetteville v. Spur Distributing
Co., 216 N. C. 596, 5 S. E. 2d 838 (1939); Warren v. Virginia-Carolina Joint
Stock Land Bank, 214 N. C. 206, 198 S. E. 624 (1938) ; Poovey v. Hickory, 210
N. C. 630, 188 S. E. 78 (1936) ; Federal Res. Bank v. Atmore, 200 N. C. 437, 157
S. E. 129 (1931); Ellis v. Ellis, 198 N. C. 767, 153 S. E. 449 (1930); Tar Heel
Hosiery Mill v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 198 N. C. 596, 152 S. E. 794 (1930) ; Best
v. Clyde, 86 N. C. 4 (1882).
"I" Although the recent case of Hinson v. Britt, 232 N. C. 379, 61 S. E. 2d 185
(1950), discussed in section I of this paper, has made it clear that the movant
has no absolute right to have non-prejudicial matter stricken, even though irrele-
vant, it is not anticipated that this case will affect the rule as to immediate appeals
since each case presents the possibility that the movant will be prejudiced when
the pleadings are read to the jury, the determination of which question necessarily
involves a consideration of the merits. As a practical matter, the emphasis placed
upon the necessity for a showing of prejudice, in order to secure a reversal, may
have some tendency to discourage appeals.
"'0 Best v. Clyde, 86 N. C. 4 (1882) ; ef. the statement in Fayetteville v. Spur
Distributing Co., 216 N. C. 596, 600, 5 S. E. 2d 838, 841 (1939): "In both in-
stances it is subject to review, of course, since the power of the court must be
exercised in accordance with legal principles and established procedure." In this
case the motion had been granted.
12 "While the motion to strike was not made in proper time, that did not
divest the court of the power, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to allow the
motion. . . ." Warren v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 214 N. C.
206, 208, 198 S. E. 624, 625 (1938) (motion denied). See also Tar Heel Hosiery
Mill v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 198 N. C. 596, 597, 152 S. E. 794, 795 (1930)
(motion in apt time; denied).
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the motion may be denied when to grant it would not be error, whereas,
if granted, a reversal may be secured on appeal without showing an
abuse of discretion. 122 This must necessarily be true as, otherwise, the
movant could prejudice the pleader's right of appeal by delaying his
motion.
The provisions of G. S. 1-153 regarding- the time for making the
motion seem to have been drawn primarily to apply to motions directed
to the complaint. The motion is to be made "before answer or de-
murrer, or before an extension of time to plead is granted." Of course,
there is no answer to an answer or to a reply. The principle of the
statute may be easily applied when the pleading to which the motion
is directed requires a responsive pleading within a specified time-i.e., an
answer, properly served, containing a counterclaim. It is not so easily
applied, when the motion is tlirected to a pleading which requires no
responsive pleading and when no time is specified within which to
demur. It seems likely, in such cases, that the motion may be made as
of right if made within a reasonable time and the movant has not, there-
tofore, demurred or voluntarily filed a responsive pleading.
The court has recognized that the "apt time" principle applies to
motions directed to answers and replies, but has not spelled out, in
-detail, what constitutes apt time in these situations.'12
It would seem that denial of a motion to strike evidentiary or re-
dundant allegations should always be regarded as discretionary and
seldom reversed; but the court has announced the same rules as in
the case of irrelevancy. 124  Probably the primary reason is that the
statute makes no distinction as to the treatment of irrelevant and re-
dundant matter, and while it may have been intended as a grant of
discretion, it has not been so construed in the cases involving irrelevancy.
B. Scandalous and Impertinent Matter.
The motion to strike as scandalous may probably be made as of
122 See Underwood v. Watson, 223 N. C. 437, 27 S. E. 2d 144 (1943) ; Chason
v. Marley, 223 N. C. 738, 28 S. E. 2d 223 (1943)..2. Fleming v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 229 N. C. 397, 50 S. E. 2d 45
(1948) (motion to strike "cross-action" from answer) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217
N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940) (matter in reply) ; Patterson v. Southern Ry.,
214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938) (affirmative defense) ; Little v. Bost, 208 N. C.
762, 182 S. E. 448 (1935) (reply); Brown v. Southern Ry., 202 N. C. 256, 162
S. E. 613 (1932) (affirmative defense) ; Federal Res. Bank v. Atmore, 200 N. C.
437, 157 S. E. 129 (1931) (affirmative defense); cf. Brown v. Hall, 226 N. C.
732, 40 S. E. 2d 412 (1946) (motion to strike affirmative defense made at trial;
not in apt time).
12. Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 221 N. C. 292, 20 S. E. 2d 299
(1942) ; and see Long v. Love, 230 N. C. 535, 53 S. E. 2d 661 (1949) ; Hawkins
v. Moss, 222 N. C. 95, 21 S. E. 2d 873 (1942). A rule of discretion is announced
in Revis v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 237, 176 S. E. 738 (1934) and in Life Ins. Co.
of Va. v. Smathers, 211 N. C. 373, 190 S. E. 484 (1937), but in each of those
cases the motion was granted.
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right at any time. 25 Although the power to strike matter as scandalous
has been limited by its relevancy, that which is both irrelevant and
scandalous is an abuse of legal process and an indirect imposition upon
the court itself. Not only is no time specified within which a motion
must be made, but no motion is expressly required by the rule of prac-
tice dealing with the power to strike.126  As the court may strike
scandalous allegations on its own initiative,127 the motion is relegated
to a convenient device through which to focus the court's attention.
When the court itself has a stake in the matter-the necessity of pre-
serving its dignity-no question of waiver by a litigant's delay arises.
C. Frivolous Pleadings.
When an answer or demurrer is adjudged frivolous, a final judg-
ment entered on the pleadings is, of course, appealable. But a denial
of a motion to strike as frivolous and for judgment is not immediately
appealable. 128 The advantage afforded by the statute, in opening the
way for judgment on the pleadings when the motion to strike is granted,
does not follow as a matter of course since the decision whether to per-
mit the other party to plead over remains within the sound discretion
of the trial judge. But whereas no appeal will lie from an order deny-
ing a motion to strike a demurrer as frivolous, provided the demurrer
is contemporaneously overruled, 20 an order sustaining a demurrer to
an entire pleading is, of course, appealable. It is therefore the refusal
to hold frivolous, as distinguished from some concurrent action involv-
ing a substantial right, which is not appealable.
When the motion to strike as frivolous is the equivalent of a motion
to strike for irrelevancy, it seems that the appeal rules governing the
latter motion might well, apply.130
D. When Motion Directed to Entire Cause of Action, Defense or
Counterclaim.
As already indicated, when the motion to strike is directed to an
entire cause of action, defense or counterclaim, it becomes the functional
equivalent of a demurrer. It would therefore seem reasonable that the
rules governing appeals from rulings on the two should coincide. Yet,
it would seem patently unreasonable to allow an appeal on the merits
..See Best v. Clyde, 86 N. C. 4, 6 (1882)."26 Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, Rule 20(3).
' 2 7See Mitchell v. Brown, 88 N. C. 156, 157 (1883).
"8 Parker v. North Carolina R. R., 150 N. C. 433, 64 S. E. 186 (1909) ; Mor-
gan v. Harris, 141 N. C. 358, 54 S. E. 381 (1906) ; Abbott v. Hancock, 123 N. C.
89, 31 S. E. 271 (1898) ; Walters v. Starnes, 118 N. C. 842, 24 S. E. 713 (1896) ;
see Brogden v. Henry, 83 N. C. 274, 275 (1880) ; Hull v. Carter, 83 N. C. 249,
251 (1880).
129 Parker v. North Carolina R. R., supra note 128; Morgan v. Harris, supra
note 128; Abbott v. Hancock, supra note 128.
"0 See Teasley v. Teasley, 205 N. C. 604, 172 S. E. 197 (1934).
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of a motion to strike specific allegations within a cause, defense or
counterclaim,13 1 while denying an appeal from a decision on a motion
to strike the entire cause, defense or counterclaim. As a result, the
general rule which permits immediate appeal from an adverse ruling on
a motion to strike, made in apt time, has been followed where the attack




If, on the other hand, the attack is in the form of a "demurrer,"
there are two situations in which the immediate appeal has been dis-
missed as fragmentary: (1) where the attack involves less than all the
causes or defenses and is overruled; 1m and (2) where the attack is
against a counterclaim, whether overruled or sustained, unless the
counterclaim presents the only issues to be tried.13
4
Since the rules as to motions to strike and as to demurrers are thus
in direct conflict and the applicability of either 'depends upon the label
attached to the objection by the objecting party, it is theoretically appar-
ent that one should be discarded. However, the motion to strike rule
has now been reiterated so often that it is unlikely to be changed, 3 5 and
an express reversal of the demurrer rule is probably not to be antic-
ipated. But the conflict appears to be one possessing an inherent
capacity to resolve itself, since, if the rules are not made to conform,
the motion to strike will be used by attorneys either in conjunction with
or to the exclusion of the partial demurrer. When the motion to strike
is used alone, the demurrer rule is not considered by the court. And
when the motion and demurrer are jointly employed, the tendency seems
to be to overlook the rule which might be applied if only demurrer had
been employed.
1" See subsection A of this section supra.
1 32Patuxent Development Co. v. Bearden, 227 N. C. 124, 41 S. E. 2d 85
(1947) ; Sayles v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940) ; Virginia Trust
Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938); cf. Horton v. Perry, 229
N. C. 319, 49 S. E. 2d 734 (1948) (defendant A's motion to strike cross-claim
from defendant B's answer denied by the lower court; sustained as a "demurrer"
on appeal).
""Headman v. Comm'rs of Brunswick County, 177 N: C. 261, 98 S. E. 776
(1919) ; Chambers v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 172 N. C. 555, 90 S. E. 590 (1916) ;
Shelby v. Charlotte Electric Ry., Light & Power Co., 147 N. C. 537, 61 S. E. 377
(1908) ; Cody v. Hovey, 216 N. C. 391, 5 S.'E. 2d 165 (1939) (by implication).
It is possible to construe G. S. 1-130, enacted in 1919, as giving a right of imme-
diate appeal from any decision on any demurrer directed to a complaint, in whole
or in part; but it does not seem to have been so construed.
"'4 Teal v. Liles, 183 N. C. 678, 111 S. E. 617 (1922); Bazemore v. Bridgers,
105 N. C. 191, 10 S. E. 888 (1890) (appeal dismissed as fragmentary with a
gratis opinion that the order sustaining demurrer to counterclaim would other-
wise have been affirmed); cf. Pilot Real Estate Co. v. Fowler, 191 N. C. 616,
132 S. E. 575 (1926) (demurrer ore tenus to counterclaim overruled; affirmed on
appeal without discussion of right of appeal). See also Horton v. Perry, 229
N. C. 319. 49 S. E. 2d 734 (1948).
"' See note 118 mtpra.
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In Hancammon v. Carr 86 the plaintiff moved to strike the entire
answer as "sham and irrelevant" and filed a demurrer to a counterclaim
contained therein. The motion was denied and the demurrer overruled
in the lower court. On immediate appeal from both orders, that deny-
ing the motiori was affirmed while that overruling the demurrer was
reversed. The counterclaim was bad but a denial saved the answer as
a whole. The right of appeal on the demurrer was not questioned.
In Vestal v. White137 a demurrer and a motion to' strike were di-
rected to a "cross-action" [counterclaim] in the answer which also
contained a denial. Both were sustained and the judgment was affirmed,
without discussing the right of the immediate appeal taken.
Thus, it seems that the question of fragmentary appeals may be
avoided entirely by using the motion to strike for irrelevancy alone or
by joining the motion with a demurrer where the latter is deemed the
more effective means of attack because of the grounds assignable. How-
ever, where the latter procedure is followed, even when the intention
is to have the two heard together, it would seem advisable to anticipate
the demurrer with the motion. Otherwise the motion would not be in
apt time,138 and if the lower court judge, in his discretion, denies it,
appeal will lie only from an abuse of discretion.
-36 229 N. C. 52, 47 S. E. 2d 614 (1948).
"37229 N. C. 414, 49 S. E. 2d 927 (1948).
... See subsection A of this section supra.
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